Foreword

At first it was not my intention to write a foreword to the present work. I therefore included some questions, usually treated in a foreword, into Chapter III of the Introduction. However, after reading, in proofs, the whole of the book and especially the Introduction, I deem it necessary to add some explanations, in order to be well understood. In fact, my remarks concerning «Theories affecting investigator's work» (Section 3, pp. 6-10) may produce the quite wrong impression that -I altogether disagree with all my predecessors and contemporaries and with all theoreticians. My intention was not to write about ethnography in general and to find out «theories helping investigator's work». The whole of the science of ethnography is of course helpful for a collector of original data, and I need not emphasize it. It is clear, at least for those who are engaged in the collecting and analysing of original materials. A great number of original investigations among the various ethnical units and groups, now carried out in all parts of the world, a great number very rich ethnographical collections found in the museums put the modern investigator into a new position, very favourable for both the theoretical result of the work and the collecting of new data. However, this favourable position also imposes great obligations on the modern investigator. Ethnography is no more a new field: the observer cannot be a naive romantic who is looking for exotic facts and situations unforeseen by the European complex; he cannot let himself to be carried away by imagination for heaping artificial constructions, perhaps satisfying one's aesthetic feeling, but perfectly useless, even dangerous, for the science; he also cannot become a collector who has no other aim but «collecting», for this attitude will soon lead to an unproductive waste of energy, which is now much needed for the passing through the coming, perhaps already going on crisis; moreover, he cannot refuse to face life, such as it is, as a historian often does, for Ethnography has ceased to be a «science about primitive tribes» which has nothing to do with «civilized mankind». The old ethnography of the nineteenth century is dead. The ethnographer — historian is nowadays working at the restoration, as far as possible, of the complexes of the past; the field ethnographer, armed with all possible theoretical knowledge, is describing and analysing «living» complexes, as complexes in their functional and historical aspects. In this respect the ethnographer comes near to the historian and all those specialists who are dealing with various aspects of culture (i.e. Ethnography) among the so-called civilized ethnical groups. In fact, the study of cultural complexes is not of yesterday. But it was confined to special manifestations of the complexes. The study of the common law, stimulated by a practical need of its codification, or merely of comprehensive recording for practical use; the study of the social organisation, language, art, various aspects of technology, etc. stimulated by various reasons; even the study of the technical and, naturally, economic processes imposed by their functioning - all these special studies actually dealt with the same phenomenon of «cultural adaptation in man» which called to life the ethnographer and stimulated the organization of the new science of ethnography. We can now leave aside the question as to the practical stimuli which undoubtedly were greatly responsible for the existence of ethnographers and ethnography, but the philosophical premises are of importance for our present treatment. The almost general theoretical conception, even among the most clear — thinking people, was, firstly, that all cultural complexes, besides those with which the Europeans were familiar, were relatively simple and primitive, so that any educated man could understand and describe them and, secondly, that by studying them it was possible to write the history of the present civilized mankind. At the first contact with the realities it appeared, almost at once, that the culture of supposedly primitive peoples was not as simple as it had originally seemed and, a curious fact, a great number of ethnographers «specialized» in «material culture», material organization», «religion», «language», even «folklore», «decorative art», «family», «primitive economics» etc. to such a degree that they easily could have degenerated into an inferior class of technologists, philosophers, philologists dealing with «primitive phenomena». However, the pressure of life was strong enough and the ethnographer has successfully survived by cutting his ties with the old philosophical premises and by creating, by means of facts, the necessary basis for Ethnology (in my sense). Another effect of the increase of knowledge was that the idea of reconstituting history appeared to have been inadequate for doing this work by simple means of scaffolding of hypotheses. There was one still more important effect, namely, the ethnographer has realized that he must not only pay attention to the «primitive people», but his attention must also be attracted by the ethnical groups to which he is indebted for his original education and methods of thinking. The objection to such in extension of ethnography comes at once, namely, that the field of ethnography is so fast that no human being is able to fathom it. However, this objection is not based upon a scientific reasoning, but on the fear of being unable to master the task. It is perfectly true that to know all cultural complexes is impossible, but as I shall now show, it is not even needed. Whether we deny the fact of the existence of ethnography, as here defined, or not, it does not change the situation. Such situations happened in other fields of human knowledge. For instance, there was a time when a botanist might have known all plants known at this time, nowadays he may know only a section of the botanical classification. There was a time when a chemist knew all organic combinations known at that time, nowadays no human being can know all chemical organic combinations, of which new ones are moreover discovered every day. However, nobody will say that Botany or Organic Chemistry cannot exist, or even that they do not exist, as it happens with timid people when they face a really enormous quantity of ethnographic facts known and, especially still to be known.

We must acknowledge that such a state has already been reached by Ethnography, and this implies a new attitude on the part of ethnographers.

Now, I must make another step in order to approach my goal. There was a time when a botanist needed no special training in general biology, chemistry, physics, microscopic technique and even applied mathematics, but nowadays he must have this training before he may become a modern botanist. There was also a time when a chemist needed no special training in physics, chemophysics and mathematics and could go ahead with his discoveries. The inference is evident: to be a botanist or a chemist (organic) nowadays is much more difficult than it was before, if one wants to make discoveries in these fields and not to remain a qualified servant in a botanical museum or a chemical laboratory, where such specialized and qualified workmen nowadays are needed, just as on board of a man-of-war a high percentage of skilful specialists is needed, even with a high (equivalent to the European university) education. Why should it be different with Ethnography?

However, there is another aspect of the same situation. In the beginning of the nineteenth century it would have seemed impossible for a young man to have done in physics what nowadays is done by a pupil of a middle school before his entering the university; and the modern student of a university is busy with problems which were beyond the reach of professors a century ago. The inference, often forgotten when Ethnography is discussed, is that the method of work is perfected and therefore shortened. A great number of problems are no more problems and the field is clear for further steps, because of the formulation and verification of general principles and generalisation, and, in so far as the technique of observation is concerned, because of working out of new methods of investigation. No modern physics can exist one day without its theoretical foundations. The same is true of Ethnography. Thus, in Ethnography two sides must be distinguished, namely, the first one is the collecting of new facts, which presumes a certain theoretical training and a perfect possession of modern methods for collecting facts, and the second one is the direction of investigations which presumes a broad theoretical preparation, knowledge of the factual side and a perfect mastering of methodology. In so far as the collecting is concerned it must, of course, not be based upon the trial-error method, as it was practised before, but special methods justified by and based upon certain theoretical foundations must be worked out, and so it will be, if Ethnography is not doomed to perish. There is nothing impossible in it, for we have such instances in some special branches of ethnography. For instance, in olden days it would take many years to record the common law of an ethnical unit, with the present knowledge of theoretical jurisprudence it takes a few weeks; a description of a dialect (including vocabulary, phonetics and morphology) in olden days would take years of work, with the familiarity with general linguistical it does not take more than a few weeks. The same holds good for social organization, also economics and technology in general, but on the condition that one be familiar with the theory, However, even when one is technically prepared to do the gathering of facts, one may easily remain automatic in collecting new facts, which sometimes may perhaps become quite superfluous if one is not sufficiently versed in the theoretical side. In fact, the ethnographer is only a collector of facts and even not always an analyst. The cases of collecting facts which cannot be analysed and published because of their volume are well known. Therefore, to know how many facts are needed is not less important than to know how to make it within a short time. The collecting of facts may easily degenerate into a «mania of collecting» Although the facts may be quite curious and artfully prosecuted, they are often superfluous, if the trend of Science in general is disregarded. I shall give now an absurd example of an insane botanist who is measuring one by one the leaves of all trees which he meets on his way. The work may be accurate, painstaking, almost heroic, but it is useless, since the biometrical methods may shorten this work. One may spend one's life on the most accurate record of individual phonetic variations, but it will not contribute anything to the knowledge of the nature of language, the fundamental being already discovered. In the same way, to follow up all possible dialectal variations, going from village to village, and from house to house, will not differ very much from the work of the botanist measuring leaf by leaf. Of course, one may find pleasure even in collecting stamps, used pens and musical records for gramophone in a number surpassing the physical possibility of enjoying them. But, I have never heard of any contributor to finances, steel work and music among the people who were affected by the mania of collecting stamps, pens and musical records. One sometimes finds pleasure in folklore, as such, and in general ethnography, as such, but if it turns into a mania of collecting, I greatly doubt that such a condition may be considered as completely harmless, should it occupy too many people in the ethnical unit (or group). The refinement of amateurs of cock fighting, flea racing and that of various gamblers, all of whom have pleasure in their occupations, is not sufficient for a social (ethnical) justification of their activity. Under ever increasing interethnical pressure these seemingly harmless and seemingly aesthetic passions may paralyse the ethnical unit, if the thinking layer of the unit is affected by them. Thus, this kind of justification of an aimless ethnographic collecting of facts cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and such a collecting cannot be considered as useful for the science and completely harmless for the ethnical units to which the collectors belong, if they still can be useful members of the society; but, of course, such a passion may be utilized by those who direct the Science. By pointing out these seemingly paradoxical parallels, I intend only to show that the overgrowth and further «degeneration» of a useful cultural phenomenon, such as an ethnographical collecting, may occur, if there is no directing science behind the ethnographers. Just as behind the qualified workmen in botany, the systematists, and the qualified workmen in chemistry, the experimentators in organic chemistry, there are the general biology and General chemistry which direct these skilful workmen, behind the ethnographer-collector there must be a science which is able to direct him. As a matter of fact, the history of ethnography always reflected this situation. On the one hand, there was a tendency of specialization in the sense of further dissection of ethnography, as stated above, and «specialists» intended to simplify in this way their work and to remain beyond control; on the other hand, there was an open protest against an interference of theoreticians and a marked tendency to become «specialists ethnographers». The first tendency needs no explanation, but the second one needs some remarks. It must be admitted that the tendency to eliminate the interference of theoreticians, as shown before, was greatly due to the failure of the theoreticians to show a right direction to the collectors who soon appeared to be ahead of them. The latter were not so much familiar with the actual facts. This was a period of trial-error in theory, and the same in practice of collecting material. However, apart from it, the protest and tendency of specialization were in the same line of other phenomena left without a real theoretical guidance. The fundamental problems, such as where the unit is to be investigated, where the dialect is to be recorded, what the mechanism of formation of complexes (and «complexes» have appeared only lately) is; how the elements spread, what to record, etc. were left without answer, whilst the theoreticians were arguing about the promiscuity, the origin of everything, the matriarchat and patriarchat, the totemism, the evolution of primitive mentality, without seeing any «primitive man», and hundreds of other things interesting for the philosophical trend of the last century. Lately introduced discussions as to the «psychological method», diffusion and parallelism, «soma» and «noos» and other «problems» cannot at all satisfy the ethnographer's demand for guidance.

Naturally, all these answers may be given only by a general science - Ethnology - i.e. the theory of ethnical and ethnographical variations and that of ethnical unit, with a special part dealing with the definition of the present state of ethnology in the system of knowledge (science), and principles of classification, which covers all manifestations of human existence and treats them not in abstractions, but in complexes and individuals, as they are observed in life. Thus the physical conditions of ethnical bodies and their cultural complexes will not be artificially dissected for the reason of difference in the form of biological adaptation. Of course such a science requires much more preliminary work than any specialized branch, but it may be remembered that there was a time when for the same reason General Biology, Chemophysics, even General Linguistics were misdoubted and the possibility of their existence was questioned. Sooner or later such a general science will be created or else the depending sciences, such as anthropology, ethnography, including folklore, linguistics and others, will grow into a malignant tumor and suffocate under the piles of unanalysed, unclassified and perhaps useless facts. The signs of such an overgrowth are now already visible. On the one hand, self-restriction in the analysis can be observed, such as the tendency to make of ethnography a simple «historical» discipline, or to build it on the basis of some internal mechanisms of culture, e.g. the functionalism, as a new wording for the old «utility», the famous schematization of «instincts», such as «hunger», «sex» etc. which idea is closely connected with that of Elementargedanke, and ethnography of «internal evidences» or to make of it a kind of «applied ethnography» at the service of the administration, and still narrower, at the service of political parties. Ethnography has of course its historical aims, but to identify it with «History» is impossible, for, first of all, history is not the only aim of ethnography, and for some specialists-historians it is not yet clear what they have to do — to record fact by fact, to record what seems to be important, to create a kind of «philosophy of history, to analyse the facts, to operate with the «values», to analyse «geography» and «races» in action, or to make of it a kind of «applied history» for the use of political propaganda.

History has its own problems of technique, such is verification of the authenticity of documents, operation with the sequence of facts, chronology, classification etc., like any other branch of knowledge, which collects and describes facts, has its own technique. But the historians have failed to create a general science (perhaps owing to the complexity and complexal character of historical facts dealt with) which could direct the historian in his work; and his position does not differ from that of the ethnographer who looks for guidance. However, in «so far as technique is concerned, the experience of the historians» is great enough and useful for any science dealing with a sequence of facts. Naturally the technique of the historians of the past century cannot be used nowadays — the historian cannot be indifferent e.g. to the fact of a change occurring in a population, from the anatomical (anthropological) point of view, at two different historical moments; he cannot be indifferent to the conclusion of an ethnographer, when the latter gives his analysis of the ethnical composition of a population, and he cannot be indifferent when the palaeontologist analyses extinct and living species of animals found in the archaeological strata, although the methods of the anthropologist, ethnographer and palaeontologist are not those of a historian of the nineteenth century. The historian of our days, if he wants to be at the level of modern science, must be competent in his judgement as to the methods used by the «scientists». Actually it means that the scope of the modern historian's work is much wider than that of the historian of the nineteenth century. In fact the historian cannot confine himself to the «historical method» alone. The dividing line, that was intended to be created between «history» and «science», has now disappeared, and this idea is now maintained only by those who did not master the methods of «science» and who do not want to see that there are Science and various techniques proper to the nature of facts dealt with by specialists in differently specialized branches of knowledge.

Undoubtedly, to understand the internal mechanism of any cultural complex is the primary task to be fulfilled by the ethnographer. True, it may be only «functional» or «interno-evidential», gedonistic, materialistic, historical, i.e. the light may be thrown only from one side, but it will be done, for it is now realized that one can no more disregard the complex of culture. It is also clear that such a specialized approach to the internal mechanism of complexes is not sufficient, for the «causes» of processes, which are going on in the cultural complexes, sometimes lie far from the internal mechanisms. In this respect the attempts at calling attention of ethnographers to «human biology», «geographical environment and «history», i.e. external and not «cultural» conditions, must be regarded as a vital necessity. It is interesting to note that even in this case the above mentioned tendency of «specialization» takes hold of ethnographers.

I need not dwell long on the trend of «practical value» of ethnography, so much emphasized nowadays when the ethnographer wants to get the support of rulers who do not know how delicate the mechanism of psychomental complex is which produces, — amongst others, the cultural element of science, functionally bound to cognize without any practical aim. This stimulus of cognition has ever existed and is only in element of the working mechanism, but should this stimulus restrict the activity of the ethnographer, it would be only pernicious for the ethnographer.and ethnography. In fact, no same man can think of using a learned engineer for driving in nails, and a physicist for repairing type-writing machines. As soon as ethnography becomes an instrument of «practical value» it ceases to function as Science, and thus its inferences cannot be reliable. More-over, such a «practicism» unavoidably leads to a narrow specialization of an ethnographer who ceases to be ethnographer. As shown, such an ethnography existed for a long time without being called ethnography. To revert to this type and trend of investigation is nothing but a manifestation of a conscious or unconscious desire to stop the too fast growth of ethnography. This is the same attitude which is manifested in the narrowing of the «point of view», and in the making of ethnography a simple «history».

Such a state of things is not typical of the ethnography alone. A great number of other «humanities», such as e.g. sociology, history, even partly economics and others, are in search for an issue out of the entanglement in the forest of imaginative theories which were created owing to an artificial approach to new facts and methods of investigation. It is not an impasse, as some writers suppose, but it is a real crisis: the old methods of analysis and generalization cannot cover all facts acquired by the special and specialized branches of knowledge. We have a very good example in the psychology which lies already severed connection with «philosophy» and in this movement has made even a too great swing which, it is true, may also result in an artificial narrowing and «specialization». Of course, it is only a temporary reaction.

Should such a state of things be maintained in Ethnography, it will remain in the imaginary impasse. Moreover, if Ethnography does not fortify its theoretical rear and does not organize itself, it will suffocate under the weight of facts. We have also the very interesting instance of sociology in America. The thin body of theoretical sociology, i.e. the theory of social organization and function, can hardly be increased by means of old methods, while its body is now stuffed with theories, which may have only a historical interest, and with an enormous collection of facts concerning all those phenomena which are an effect of the contact between two and more individuals. Catch-words — «social», «society», etc. — happened to be stronger than simple good sense. All the practical problems imposed by the functioning of «modern society» were covered by the «social sciences», and «sociology» has tried to treat all of them. Such functions as these of policemen, inspectors of mores, municipal clerks, sales-agents for contraceptive apparatuses, advertising agents, labour inspectors, even modest teachers, etc. have been transformed into «social workers» whose activity must be put into a «sociological frame». Owing to this the really horrible mixture of «applied sociology», and its theoretical justification in the form of «Principles of Sociology» completely submerged the meagre theory. With this overgrown appendix, — a malignant tumour of «practicism» of half-educated people, — the «theory» should be, at least in volume, enlarged by including all theories which were ever produced — from Plato up to the last year's productions. Of course, they are quite interesting from the historical point of view, but one must be historian and ethnographer for being able to treat them. There are excellent chemists who do not know theories of various alchemists of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. What importance for Science of our time can have aberrations of Rousseau, Montesquieu and others, by accident selected «thinkers» of the past, when they are treated ad nauseam by «social sciences» which impose them on the young generations, instead of giving a simple Sociology. Here, as in Ethnography, we meet again with the same paucity of theory, the same tendency to an early specialization and the same «practicism» which have brought modern «sociology» to an impossibility of mastering, without any solid theory, an ocean of facts. Perhaps for a long time sociology will be handicapped by all these conditions and perhaps it will even not come out at all of the present entanglement.

It is not yet too late for ethnography to avoid such a situation. First of all, during the last decades a great number of ethnographical methods has been tried and proved to be useful. The technique of ethnography is far advanced: the ethnographer uses this technological knowledge, linguistical analysis, psychological analysis, statistical approach when needed, historical methods, etc.; he has no more prejudices as to the choice of his facts and ethnical groups, he has become objective, he does not approve or disapprove, he observes all cultural complexes, including ethnography itself. But what ethnography needs is theory — Ethnology — as it has been defined above. The filling up of the gap between the physical conditions of human existence and a special functional adaptation created in ethnical bodies — the cultural (ethnographical) adaptation — is beyond the power of Ethnography, as such, but it is one of the aims of Ethnology.

The relationship between the sciences may thus be formulated, if Ethnology is taken as the central point.

Unfortunately it is impossible to represent in a simplified scheme, in two dimensions, instead of the needed three, all sciences and their special branches, as well as their relations. I therefore give here only an idea of these relations. Any science here indicated may be taken as a centre.

From the scheme it can be seen that I reserve for Anthropology the place of a specialized branch of zoology, while to the Ethnography — a descriptive science -1 assign that of a specialized study of secondary adaptation going on and preserved only in groups — the ethnical unit. But the «history of human races» which at some time constituted the old Ethnology must be partly reserved for Palaeontology and for History of Mankind. Naturally, the methods of classification of human groups, the ethnical and interethnical the physical and functional (especially cultural) changes, and in general the system of equilibria (which cannot be separately solved by the anthropologists and ethnographers), the behaviour of moving populations and the spreading of cultural elements and complexes, etc. are referred to Ethnology. If this had been done earlier, a great number of «problems», such as the «influence of environment», «anthropogeography». «heredity versus milieu»; «diffusion versus parallelism» and others would never have arisen. The very important generalizations and analytical descriptions of ethnographical phenomena have already been made, so in this sense Ethnology exists without being recognized fact, various problems are answered in Anthropology, Ethnography, Linguistics, Archaeology, history and even Ethnology as it was known in the nineteenth century. I am in favour of a strict demarcation, for the old Anthropology — the Science of man — like the Naturphilosophie of the beginning of the XlXth century has overgrown itself. There is, at least now, no better name than Ethnology. Of course, the main objection to such a science is that it requires too much preliminary work of an ethnologist, but this cannot be helped. As stated above, the same objection was made when General Biology appeared. Theoretically it may be foreseen what kind of objections will be raised by the persons specialized along particular lines, but it will not stop (it may only retard) the growth of Science, for life is stronger than any individual effort, and Science is life. I do not think that in future there will be a very great number of ethnologists, but by analogy with what is observed in other scientific fields it may be supposed that there will be, as before, specialists in anthropology, linguistics and ethnography, even specialists in crania, Eskimo grammar, and social organisation, whose contributions to the science will be of the greatest importance.

It is evident that a further growth of Ethnology into a science, to some degree similar to General Biology, is postulated as a particular manifestation of the general growth of Science. If the latter declines, together with the whole cultural complex, or if the cultural complex is entirely modified and science is substituted by something else, there will be no question about Ethnology. However, the number of ethnographers, anthropologists and linguists is now on the increase, because of the inclusion of new ethnical units, at least partially, into the same cultural cycle, — the Japanese, Indian and Chinese contributors are coming and they must be satisfied with the answers that may be given only by Ethnology.

Looking back at the work accomplished during the period when Anthropology, Ethnography and Ethnology formally existed, it must be definitely recognized that the present advancement in all these branches of knowledge is due to the brilliant past. Within four generations profound investigations in all directions were accomplished. A summary description of almost all ethnical units of the Earth, from the point of view of their physical and cultural characters, is possible; a great number of facts concerning physical and cultural history of man relieves us from the worry about the unknown; the methods of investigation are perfected; the foundation of Ethnology is laid down. Among the figures of the past those who collected new facts and those tried to decipher their meaning were great men. Of course, the facts collected remain as they are, and their contributors will remain for ever great men, but the greatness of those who attempted deciphering should not be minimized. They might be right or wrong, but their efforts created the milieu in which every new generation felt more and more confidence in its work. Queer as it may now seem, the construction of evolutionists of the nineteenth century has helped in its way; narrow as they are the systems of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, still surviving, have cleared up the field of theory. It is only for the sake of saving time that I express in the brief manner of a wholesale rejection my disagreement with certain theories of the past, and for the same reason my remarks about the epigones of the great men and uncritical imitators may assume the form of «polemics». However, I must point out that the class of imitators and vulgarizers in theory who influence the young generation of ethnographers is a real social burden.

* * *

In the present Foreword I need not repeat what I have said in the forewords to my «Social Organization of the Northern Tungus» and «Social Organization of the Manchus». Now I want to stress the fact that my approach to the cultural phenomena is not of yesterday and that it was formulated during and just after the investigation had been carried out. However, in my earlier works I could not touch upon this question so much as I can do it now. The reason is threefold, namely, the space allowed for theoretical excursuses is now much larger; the facts are presented; the reader is more prepared by my former publications to meet opinions which are not common and which often are only my own opinions. In some remarks concerning my former publications I have noticed a tendency to bind me up together with some «schools deem it necessary to say that as an ethnographer I consider myself to be of the «ethnological (in my sense) school». Of course, in Ethnography there can be no «points of view»; there can be only one possible treatment of facts — the ethnological one.

During the last proof-reading I have met with some misprints. Unfortunately, under the actual conditions of printing, they could not be avoided. Some of them I have corrected in the Glossary and Indexes, but some of them, when they were evident, I have left without corrections. This time I had greatly to abbreviate my glossary and indexes, because of their possible dimensions. I must also appeal to the indulgence of the reader for my English. In this sense I was helped by Professor R. D. Jameson who made some polishing of the first 48 pages, by recommended by him Miss B. Wingfield who did pp. 49 - 240 and by Mr. O. Klemm, who went over the rest of the work. I am greatly indebted to these persons. Any one who is familiar with the conditions of printing of such works as the present one, may realise that Mr. B. A. Romanovsky who, being manager of the Press, supervized the printing, deserves my best thanks.

This work was prepared for publication during a long time. After the completion of the collecting of the material the latter could not be used before the linguistical analysis had been completed. Yet the writing had to be still more postponed because I considered it necessary to publish other works dealing with other aspects of the Tungus cultural adaptation and especially with the classification of the Tungus groups. So, when all preliminary steps had been made and the material had been analysed, in 1932 — 1933,1 proceeded with the writing. During that time I consciously avoided any reading of recent publications connected with the subject. In fact, the freshness of new publications may sometimes lead astray. However, after completing my writing a perusal of some new publications, such as those by R. Marret, P. Radin and some others, has convinced me that I need not introduce any new additions and interpretations. This is the reason why the reader will not find references to some very recent works, my general attitude towards them being clear from the present Foreword and the Introduction.

After reading this work I have regretted that I had too much abbreviated the whole of the Part One, dealing with the positive knowledge, and Chapter XV dealing with the various hypotheses. However, it was necessary to shorten the exposition for the word had already assumed a length by far surpassing the usual size. For this length I must apologize to the reader. Once I had the idea to recommend to the reader some chapters and sections of general interest, but after the last reading of the work I gave up this idea because the Tungus Psychomental Complex can be understood only as a whole, as a complex, and reading of isolated chapters and sections may give a distorted picture of the Tungus and of the author.

The Author.

Peiping, China. June 1935.