Any investigator into the problem of variations of cultural and physical phenomena in man will sooner or later come to the idea that these variations take place in certain human groups which exist as units. Several attempts have been made at finding such a unit. It was supposed, for instance, that these processes took place in «races,» in «nations,» in small or large political units, or in other groups. Yet, since the units suggested could not be accepted as concrete ones in which these processes are proceeding, it was suggested to regard them as going on in «mankind.» However, all the processes under this investigation are concrete processes, while «mankind» is an abstraction which does not help at all in understanding the mechanism of variations. The approach to this problem is greatly handicapped by the fact that the units in which the processes are going on may not be formally marked by any signs of distinction and very often they are not recognized as existing and functioning units. Yet the latter are not static phenomena; they are themselves rather processes than sharply outlined units. However, the finding of such static units is required by statically behaving minds. On the other hand, great specialization amongst the investigators, or better, great limitations of interests and competence practised by the investigators, are partly responsible for omitting the facts which distinguish one group from another. A great misfortune for the students of cultural phenomena is also reasoning by analogy with biological investigations. Since in biology the investigation into the variations (evolution) of certain physical organs is one of usual and quite successful methods for tracing the sequence of animal forms, it was postulated that the same could be done with cultural phenomena and even with isolated cultural elements. This trend of ideas existed side by side with another movement which was always trying various ways in order to find the correct solution of the problem of the human unit.
The importance of cultural phenomena, in the classification of human groups, was realized long ago. Linneus introduced into his classification of human «races» and «species,» i. e., purely zoological conceptions, the cultural element side by side with psycho-mental distinctions. This trend of ideas led to a classification which was very successful, chiefly owing to its simplicity; namely, the famous linguistico-anthropological classification of Fr. Mueller. Of course, in this form it was a pure absurdity, chiefly due to badly digested biological ideas and a series of erroneous postulates. We now know that such an approach to the problem is not correct, for the «races» do not exist as units and the cultural phenomena (including language) are not confined to such units. However, the idea of including cultural phenomena into the complex of «biological» phenomena and as an essential characteristic of human groups is quite correct. In fact, the essential element of adaptation of human groups (and individuals) is the cultural phenomena transmitted by tradition, which itself is a function of continuing units. The need of quick adaptation of human groups (and individuals) stimulates a further increase of the importance of cultural phenomena: the faster the tempo of variations in human groups, the more important are cultural phenomena as a method of adaptation. In fact, the adaptation of man to various climatic conditions is not only going on along the line of physical change, as is usual with the animals which do not practise cultural adaptation very much, but it is going on along the line of cultural invention. This is true not only of adaptation to climatic conditions, but it also holds good for the adaptation to the primary milieu in general, and particularly when the increase of population implies an increase of food supply by means of the technical perfection of food production, etc. It is also true of the adaptation of social organization, which must be well adjusted to the needs of economic activity. It is thus evident that cultural phenomena are nothing but a new and specific form of biological phenomenon of adaptation which is affecting chiefly the function, and perhaps the matter, of the brain in the process of adaptation, at the present time leaving only secondary importance to bodily changes. By these remarks it is not to be presumed that no physical change is involved in the process of human adaptation. In my work on the process of growth I have shown that the cultural adaptation resulted in the extension of the period of growth which involved a series of other physical changes, the latter being possible only as the condition of complex biological variations, including perhaps a change of chemical equilibrium. So cultural adaptation is not so simple as it is sometimes pictured, and it does not go without affecting the physical features, especially the chemical functioning of the organism. All cultural, morphological, chemical, and psycho-mental variations are closely correlated and bound together, which points still more strongly to the «biological» character of cultural adaptation.
I shall not repeat here the history of the modifications of the idea of physical units in man as «races,» «species,» and «types,» — a question of great complexity, — for already I have recently dealt with it. I shall point out my conclusion; namely, that the process of physical variations in man is proceeding in units which are differentiated owing to the distinction of cultural complexes, at present the chief method of human adaptation. With such an approach to the problem the units of mankind long ago appeared as specific ones, but the nature of these units could not be defined at once. In fact, as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, a term for the designation of such a unit was introduced. The term was not one similar to such current terms as «race,» «nation,» etc., but it was one which was borrowed from the Greek word ethnos, introduced into the compound terms of «ethnology» and «ethnography.» In the hands of specialists who had confined their interests to cultural phenomena, particularly languages, or to physical phenomena, these terms have, however, been misused and even «translated» into different languages until their original meaning has escaped the attention of specialists, and as the conception of unit was not clearly formulated, they have almost been forgotten altogether [6].
The revival of the term is, however, badly needed. I made this attempt in published form nearly ten years ago, and at about the same time, the same or nearly the same idea arose from other quarters. Since the present work deals with the problem of language in further treatment of the problem, I must here detain myself on some aspects of human units.
6. In order to avoid a discussion concerning «words,» I want to point out that the sciences dealing with various aspects of man and human beings must be distinguished on the principle of practical utility. I shall use «anthropology» as a branch of zoology; ''ethnography» as a description of ethnical units chiefly from the cultural point of view; and «ethnology» as a science dealing with the general principles of processes observed in man whose unit, where the process of variation occurs, is «ethnos.» Since cultural adaptation is only a particular form of human adaptation,— a purely biological phenomenon,— the science of ethnology is indeed one of the branches of general biology which is regarded as the science dealing with the principles of variations of «living» matter in its various forms. The place of archeology, prehistory, history, also linguistics, etc., is evident. The controversy as to the terms is not yet settled. Recently, P. Rivet («L'Anthropologie,» in Scientia, Vol. XLVIII, 1930) has again discussed this question advocating the preservation of anthropologie for the science here designated as «ethnology» and reserving «anthropologie S. S.» (somatic) for «anthropology.» I prefer the term «ethnology,» for this science deals chiefly with «ethnoses,» while «anthropology» deals with «anthropos.» Yet it seems to me that, historically, «ethnography» and «ethnology» are just as good as «anthropology» and the scientific trend points to the need of a term with a constant form, such as «anthropology.»' This deviation of sense, as P. Rivet (op. cit, p. 89) says, has deep reasons; namely, the accumulation of new facts and the specialization of methods. As a matter of fact, one may be a good anthropologist without being an ethnographer, and one may be a good ethnographer without being an anthropologist. Yet both of them may, as is actually observed amongst specialists, remain so without becoming ethnologists. Of course, ethnology cannot be identified with ethnography, nor with anthropology.