The function of language as described in previous sections is such in its nature that it cannot be considered as a phenomenon independent of other conditions of ethnoses. Yet, in a lesser degree still, it is possible to consider it as an entity controlled by internal laws of changes characteristic of languages only. Indeed, so far as the language is a function of human adaptation, it does not differ in its process of variation from any other secondary adaptive function. In spite of the great simplicity of the problem, as it stands, the current ideas on languages, their relations, and the laws of variations are extremely complicated, owing to an artificial approach; namely, the consideration of language as an organic entity subject to its evolution. We must here be detained on the term «evolution,» which is not always understood as it should be. As a matter of fact, there are different evolutions The attempt made by A. Lotka has led him to formulate, — «evolution is the history of a system undergoing irreversible changes» («Elements of Physical Biology,» op. cit., p. 24), — identified with the second law of thermodynamics (op. cit., p. 26) [47]. However, K. Pearson's definition of evolution is different: «A casual description of the appearance of successive stages in the history of a system forms a theory of the evolution of that system. If the theory be so satisfactory that it resumes in some simple statement the whole range of organic change [italics are mine], we term it the law of evolution» [48]. But even in this definition it is presumed that the system is of a physical nature. The older definitions, so far as they come from works of great biologists, lie within the same range of physical phenomena undergoing the process of irreversible transformations. The great misconception occurred when the idea of evolution was transferred to the functional phenomena. There is no doubt that when a physical system is in a process of transformation its functioning may also change; and, as a matter of fact, in some cases one may guess the process of evolution in looking at the change of function of the system. It cannot be stated, however, that the function will always and exactly reflect the changes which occurred. Without due attention to the nature of evolution, e.g., a succession of social changes may be mistaken for an evolutive process and developed (as, for instance, by H. Spencer), into a system of evolution of social (cultural) phenomena.
The theory of evolution has spread very intensively. It was first used as a simple metaphor, afterwards as a Spencerian theory, and later it was incorporated into the European ethnographical complex as an indispensable element. In this stage it has received such deep roots that no attempt at criticizing it has been tolerated in «scientific quarters.» Indeed, in this stage of its influence on the average European mind it began to threaten the very existence of science.
In the process of further variations, the idea of evolution brought us to another conception; namely, the organic character of cultural phenomena — e.g., evolution of social phenomena; since the social phenomena evolve and since the evolution is an organic process (as observed in organisms), the social phenomena are organic phenomena. One had only to disclose where this organism was and what was its morphology and functions. As a matter of fact, this very elementary logical fallacy inspired a great number of students who soon discovered morphology and functions in all cultural phenomena. Another form of success of this idea was that the organic idea of cultural phenomena without hesitation was transferred to the special field of language. The idea was so natural, so in the air, that it was not even verified. In the hands of non-biologists the idea of evolution when applied to the functions has also been modified in the sense that evolution was referred to as any change which was going on to a certain approved or desired end. With the Spencerian addition of the idea of progress, which, according to Spencer, did not essentially differ from that of evolution, it received a pseudoscientific appearance, and the establishment of the fact of «progress» become sufficient to infer an evolutive process and, furthermore, as in an organic phenomenon. Since the definition of «progress» is essentially subjective and emotive, the biological theory did not become a scientific tool, but a justification of human behaviour. Naturally, the original idea of evolution has several times been substituted by other ideas. The symbol «evolution» referred to new referents; or, in my terminology and conception of language, the sounding starter «evolution» began to function as a starter of an entirely distinct series of conditioned reflexes; probably, owing to the lack of reflexes originally started by «evolution,» and in some cases probably because of the suppression of some conditioned reflexes formerly used. Yet semantically, this is a case of change of meaning occurring in different groups of the same ethnical unit in dependence upon the difference of psycho-mental complexes characteristic of the groups. However, what was actually distinct, as compared with older conceptions, was not only the general idea of ever-changing phenomena, but that every change must be conditioned by the laws proper to the living organism, as a complex physical phenomenon. So we may now see that many «evolutions» exist which are entirely distinct, and the starter «evolution» must be used with great caution.
The success of the «idea of evolution» was not of equal duration in various groups. The refutation has come from specialists who, after having scrutinized their respective fields, could not disclose what had been presumed by the «evolution.» However, the substitution of old ideas by new ones is long. One of the important hindrances to it are the ideas widely spread and assimilated by the ethnographical complexes, and also the modeling of a special vocabulary which is the only one in general and practical use. At last a reaction came, and students of cultural phenomena, particularly social phenomena, started a search for the «law of evolution» characteristic of their own field. In this search different methods were applied. At last, after a series of failures, «evolution» was declared to be a great misfortune for the science dealing with the cultural phenomena [49]. This movement, especially during the last thirty years, also gained students of linguistics, but the change in the attitude of theoreticians did not at once reach specialists, so that the old conception of evolution still persists amongst some of them. It is especially true of the linguists who are specialized in different groups of languages. When one observes the contradictory attitude of theoreticians on the one hand, and the survival of old evolu-tionistic conceptions amongst the specialists on the other, the confusing picture of methodological instability appears in its actuality. The question as to why the theoreticians of linguistics are not immediately followed by the specialists in various branches may be answered by pointing to the fact of a very slow change of general ideas, especially those closely correlated with the existing ethnographical complexes. As a matter of fact, the idea of evolution and the organic point of view on language is one which has already long ago received general recognition. The terminology has already been modelled to suit this point of view and it is accepted long before the modern meaning of terms used in the circle of theoreticians becomes familiar to the student. However, the revision of terminology, which is practically much more difficult than a simple acceptation of a new theory, requires great effort and also a certain amount of imagination on the part of the reviser, and can be done only by the theoreticians themselves. It has not yet been done, so the old terminology still persists in recent linguistical works. The terminology comprising starters, such as «family of languages,» «evolution of sounds,» «progress,» etc., may be absolutely misleading, for most of these linguists do not recognize the organic and evolutive nature of languages, but use these «symbols» in referring to entirely different referents. In other words, they are sometimes merely misunderstood. On the other hand, the old ideas are still effective, even amongst theoreticians — linguists. Owing to this, the specialists of the particular linguistical groups usually operate with the old conceptions of organic evolution transplanted to the languages. Although formally they refer to the modern conceptions of language, they follow the old path in their investigations, the «theory» being used only on great occasions as a formal adhesion to the up-to-date movement.
47. A. Lotka is not alone in thinking so. Nearly the same definition was given long ago by J. Chwolson (physicist), J. Perrin (chemist).
48. K. Pearson, «Grammar of Science,» London, 1900, p. 375.
49. It is remarkable that the opposition comes in a very strong form, but it does not affect the whole complex. So, for instance, W. F. Ogburn, who has broken with the old school, in 1922 said: «The significance» (of the biological ideas and naturally the theory of evolution) «was so overshadowing that it seemed to cast something like a hypnotic spell over others doing research. The biological terminology was borrowed quite widely; and it became almost a fad to refer to biological causes» («Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature,» p. 38). An analogous protest was formulated about the same period by R. Lo wie («Primitive Society,» New York, 1923) and A. L. Kroeber («Anthropology,» New York, 1923), who denied the existence of «evolution.» However the Spencerian organic and super-organic evolutions are developed (W. F. Ogburn), the «progress» figures (R. Lowie's works), and the culture is sometimes regarded as an entity with certain internal mechanisms. (A. Kroeber's idea is to establish a «genetic classification» of linguistical «families.») The same is true of many great opponents of the old evolutionistic school. In one of his latest works, F. Boas, who is greatly responsible for the anti-evolutionistic movement (regarding cultural phenomena) in America, has formulated his attitude in this question, but still he wants to maintain the idea of progress as an addition to previous knowledge and as a phenomenon of social organization, so he says that «progress in social organization refers generally to a better adaptation to economic conditions and ethnical requirements as understood according to the general state of knowledge» (op. cit. p. 103). Indeed, the «general state of knowledge,» which itself is a very flexible ethnographical phenomenon and a «better adaptation,» reduce the whole construction of a new ethnocentric point of view, which does not differ, methodologically, from the old conception of «prtgress.» By the side of this opposition there are still fervent adepts of the theory of evolution who from time to time try to survive the old conception (e.g., H. A. Ellwood, «Cultural Evolution, etc.,» London, 1927). Besides the fact of the persistence of this idea, a great source of difficulties in spreading new conceptions is the terminolcgy itself, which is accepted with the whole existing complex, and implies the acceptation of ideas. Yet I think that before a new system satisfying modern minds is worked out in detail, the reversion to the old ideas is inevitable; for, as stated, they are in the air, i.e., in the European ethnographical complex.